A Message from our President

By Calder Walton

The year 2022 witnessed the end of the Covid Pandemic’s initial phase and a return to new normality, at least in most Western countries. It was a tremendous relief. But last year was also colored by Russia’s war in Ukraine. As the human cost of that disastrous war climbs, it has never been more important for scholars to bring historical perspectives to the issues of intelligence and national security we are witnessing unfold on our screens each day. The North American Society for Intelligence History (NASIH) has much to contribute in this public-policy space.

Our Society has grown from strength to strength during the year 2022. One of the highlights for me, personally, was our annual conference, which was held virtually over the course of two days in July 2022. We suffered some minor technical glitches, but all the panel conveners and speakers overcame the gremlins and made the best of it. There were some outstanding presentations. The feedback we received was overwhelmingly positive. I know I’m not the only one
to have learned a lot over the course of the conference. I would like to thank one of our volunteers, Derik Durbin, who helped to pull it off the conference logistics.

This year we introduced some modest fees for membership and brown bag events. We did this of necessity: to provide much-needed cash. Thank you so much for all of you who have come through and officially joined our rosters. You will notice that the benefits for paid membership will grow in 2023 to include an excellent docket of virtual talks and other perks like a members-only website. If you have any suggestions for fund-raising, or any other suggestions for how we can improve the Society, please don’t hesitate to reach out to the Board. We are eager for volunteers to help with various aspects of the Society’s work.

I have greatly enjoyed serving as the Society’s President, but the time has now come for me to hand over to our Vice-President, Sara Bush Castro. I’d like to thank Sara for all her work, on top of other commitments, in making the Society a success. I know NASIH will be in safe hands, and prosper, with Sara at the helm. I’d also like to thank Dave Sherman, whose time on the Board is coming to an end. The end of 2022 also meant NASIH founders Sarah-Jane Corke and Mark Stout have stepped away leaving the next generation in charge; thanks to their hard work for building a firm foundation from which our organization can keep growing.

Our main event this coming year will be our 2023 conference, which will be held in person in Calgary. I’m greatly looking forward to seeing as many of you who can make it there as possible. Please monitor our website and social media posts for updates.

With all good wishes for a happy, and healthy, New Year!

Calder
The North American Society for Intelligence History (NASIH) is pleased to announce a call for papers for its third conference to be held at the University of Calgary in Alberta, Canada, July 20–23, 2023. NASIH’s annual conference is an important chance for intelligence scholars and practitioners to share cutting-edge research and advance intelligence history and intelligence studies.

The conference will begin with registration and a welcome reception on Thursday evening, July 20, and most participants will arrive in Calgary on that day. The main conference events and most panels will take place over July 21–22. The conference will conclude on Sunday, July 23.

Please find the full CFP on our website at [www.intelligencehistory.org/conference](http://www.intelligencehistory.org/conference). Any questions can be sent to the Program Committee at NASIHconference@gmail.com.

We hope to see you all in Calgary!
Writing Workshop

"The NASIH writing workshop was a fabulous opportunity on so many levels. The feedback from Dr. Corke and other members was invaluable in strengthening my professional writing, [and] the accountability gave me a real boost, helping me almost double my writing productivity. It’s a fabulous program."

Diana Bolsinger

"The writing group has already made a huge amount of different in my own writing. It’s a great environment and the accountability really works! Hearing from journal editors has been extremely enlightening and very valuable. I am grateful for the opportunity and look forward to reading the future work of all the future participants."

Lucy Slater

Are you a PhD student? Have you completed your comprehensive exams? Do you have a piece you would like to publish? Would you like to connect with other graduate students working in a similar area?

Beginning in January 2023 NASIH will hold its second Graduate Student Writing Workshop, designed with six goals in mind:

1. Writing Accountability
2. Supportive Group Setting
3. Virtual Brown Bag Presentation
4. Review by Leading Journals
5. Additional Submission Guidance
6. Help Navigating Peer-Review and Publishing Process

Important:

Send CV to at Dr. Eleanor Williams williamse116@cardiff.ac.uk

Space is limited! Registration is on a first come, first served basis.

Dr. Eleanor Leah Williams is currently a Tutor in International Relations at Cardiff University, having passed her Viva in September 2022 from Queen’s University Belfast. Eleanor’s background is centred around the ethics of state intelligence and counterterrorism. She has published articles in Critical Studies on Terrorism and Intelligence and National Security.
One of the highlights of the Fall 2022 virtual brownbag series was the October 4 talk by Dr. Ariane Knüsel about intelligence collection by the People's Republic of China out of its diplomatic facilities in Switzerland in the 1950s and 1960s. She described how Switzerland was initially the PRC's European intelligence hub and then became a global hub after the Sino-Soviet split. She observed that Chinese diplomats and intelligence officers during this period received much the same training, in part because when the Chinese Communists took over in 1949, they inherited no diplomats from the old regime. To fill that gap, China recruited some language students but primarily military and intelligence officers—whom it had in abundance—gave them a crash course in diplomacy and life in the West before assigning them overseas. Dr. Knüsel offered the term “diplomat-spies” to describe these individuals.

Dr. Knüsel also discussed Swiss counterintelligence efforts, characterizing them as quite small and amateurish. The country’s counterintelligence service was the Federal Police, which had only 21 men devoted to counterintelligence. Until the mid-1950s only one focused on Chinese matters; after that two men were on the account. Because of Switzerland’s federal system of government, the Federal Police outsourced surveillance jobs and detailed investigation of suspects to canton-level police forces that varied in the quality of their efforts. She further discussed the Federal Police’s liaison on Chinese matters with the CIA in particular, but also with M15, the BND, the FBI, and the French DST. The Swiss tended to be less aggressive in collecting on Chinese targets than these liaison partners would have
preferred. Finally, Dr. Knüsel noted that records on liaison with the CIA were accessible in Swiss archives but not in American archives. Overall, Dr. Knüsel offered a fascinating discussion based on original research. We hope the audience enjoyed her presentation and look forward to more Virtual Brown Bags with NASIH.


Dr. Mark Stout will step down at the end of the year as coordinator of NASIH’s Intelligence History Brownbag series. His replacement is Dr. Jeffrey Rogg of The Citadel. If you have ideas or requests for a future brownbag or comments you can contact him at jeffreyprogg@gmail.com.
by Dr. Jeffrey Rogg

The Spring 2023 Virtual Brown Bag series is shaping up well and will feature an exciting range of speakers and topics.

Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones is set to kick off NASIH’s 2023 virtual brown bags on January 17 with a discussion of his new book, *A Question of Standing*. Oxford University Press has kindly provided a coupon for a discount on the book to offer NASIH members and attendees.

Other brown bags in the works:

NASIH and the Women in Intelligence Network will co-host a brown bag featuring Amy Zegart.

David Charters will discuss his new book with Georgetown University Press on Canadian military intelligence history ahead of the 2023 ISA Annual Convention in Montreal.

Bryan Gibson will dispel allegations of CIA involvement in the 1963 coup in Iraq and Daniel Asen will address whether Chinese policeman Frank Yee was also a secret agent. We will feature talks by early career scholars including Ariel Whitfield Sobel on covert action as theatrical performance and Zhongtian Han on Chinese COMINT under Mao.

As a reminder, Virtual Brown Bags are on Tuesdays from 12-1pm EST. There is a $5 fee for non-members. Members receive complementary attendance and are provided with a registration code when they sign up for a brown bag event.
The Women’s Intelligence Network (WIN) connects, supports, and promotes female scholars who work in the field of Intelligence Studies. The overall goal is to get more research by and on women promoted, supported, and elevated in the field of Intelligence Studies. Below is an update from the core WIN programmes.

**Mentoring Programme**

The WIN mentoring programme has been a real success and is widely appreciated. WIN has managed to form a real sense of community among the mentoring group. This year, the organisers are planning more group events where mentors and mentees meet informally and where mentees can get advice on various aspects of an academic career.

**BBL**

WIN is planning to have a WIN BBL once per semester where women scholars are invited to present. Aberystwyth University is going to host these talks in future (in person, online, and in hybrid formats).

**Save the Date:** Excitingly, WIN and NASIH will hold a joint BBL talk featuring Amy Zegart on February 21st, 2023, 12-1pm ET

**Polly Corrigan Prize**


We are thrilled to see WIN striving and we will continue our work of fostering a more diverse and global intelligence studies community. Interested in joining WIN, please email us at womenintelnetwork@gmail.com.
The Soviet Intelligence History Research Group (SIHRG) is an online interactive discussion forum for those who study Soviet and Russian state security and intelligence history. Membership is informal and non-exclusive. Anyone is free to join, although those who have the ability to conduct research in the Russian language may find it easier to follow the discussions. The emphasis is on sharing information about recent publications and research, archival resources, new research methodologies, teaching strategies, etc. The guiding assumption is that the insights about Soviet-era state security and intelligence activities form the foundation for what we are seeing today in the operations of Russian state security and intelligence services.

The SIHRG was founded by NASIH members Kevin Riehle and Filip Kovacevic. At this time, the membership numbers close to 20 faculty members, graduate students, and independent researchers. The SIHRG meets on Zoom once every two months.

The inaugural meeting of the SIHRG took place on 15 January 2021 and there have been 10 meetings since. Our members have presented their research projects and we have had dynamic and insightful discussions. At our meetings since the beginning of the year, Regina Kazyulina presented her research on women’s intelligence work on the German occupied territory during WWII, Kevin Riehle analyzed the claim that “there is no such thing as a former Chekist,” Filip Kovacevic explained why ex KGB officers’ spy fiction was worth reading, and Andrew Smoot showed how one could research the intelligence files of the Russian Imperial Army without leaving one’s home.

Those interested in becoming members of the Soviet Intelligence History Research Group should email Kevin Riehle (kpreihle@olemiss.edu) or Filip Kovacevic (fkovacevic@usfca.edu) with a short description of their professional background.
Georgetown University Press has launched two book series in intelligence history.

The first, “Georgetown Studies in Intelligence History,” seeks to publish cutting-edge scholarship about the fascinating history of intelligence around the world from ancient times to the present day. The aim is not only to publish for scholars and practitioners but also to engage the public’s thirst for knowledge about this vitally important subject. The series is open to works of original research that explore intelligence as a tool of statecraft, operational histories, successes and failures, leadership, oversight, biographies of key figures, technological evolution, and espionage in culture and society. The series also seeks to go beyond the most frequently examined topics in American and British intelligence to explore the histories of nations outside of the Anglosphere as well as truly international histories.

The first book in this series has been published: David A. Charters, Canadian Military Intelligence: Operations and Evolution from the October Crisis to the War in Afghanistan. A second book is forthcoming in September, 2023: Richard J. Aldrich and Rory Cormac, Crown, Cloak, and Dagger: The British Monarchy and Secret Intelligence from Victoria to Elizabeth II. Further books are under contract.

To submit a proposal or manuscript for consideration for this series, please contact:
Donald Jacobs
Senior Acquisitions Editor
Georgetown University Press
3520 Prospect Street, NW, Suite 140
Washington, DC 20007
dpj5@georgetown.edu

Georgetown University Press is also directly commissioning volumes for the second series, “Concise Histories of Intelligence.” It will provide students and general readers with short and accessible treatments of the most important, famous, and infamous intelligence services of the past and present. The books in the series will span a wide range of national contexts, thus facilitating comparative analysis. Each author will address the origins and history of the service, its range of activities, its place in its country’s intelligence and political system, and its role in the country’s domestic and foreign security endeavors. The works will also cover the service’s culture, operational style, leaders, connections with the services of other countries, and its place in popular culture. Finally, each book will address the evolving understanding of the service over time and contains an appendix of recommended further reading for those who wish to dig deeper. Several books in this series are under contract.

The series editors for both these series are Christopher Moran (University of Warwick), Mark Phythian (University of Leicester), and former NASIH president Mark Stout (Johns Hopkins University, retired).

By Mark Stout
Podcasts are not only important educational resources for both students and the general public, but they also serve as valuable platforms for academics and professionals in related fields interested in reaching a wider audience with their work and diversifying their professional engagement and service portfolios.

These factors position podcasts and similar digital media outlets as an important realm of opportunity. Podcasts are able to deliver content that is both engaging and academically sound, with the added potential of building community and reaching truly global audiences.

A number of shows are designed with a dedicated focus on intelligence and espionage, while others include intelligence-related episodes in their catalog. Among these **SpyCast** remains a standout example. Produced by the International Spy Museum in Washington, D.C. and hosted by the museum’s historian and curator, **SpyCast** brings together practitioners, scholars, and others to discuss the often hidden world of espionage.

Similarly, **I Spy** from *Foreign Policy* features interviews with former intelligence operatives telling about their firsthand experience, while **Intelligence Matters**, hosted by former CIA director Michael Morell, interviews IC leaders about their lives, careers, and the impact of intelligence on national security policy. **The Modern Scholar Podcast** broadens this horizon to include interviews with scholars and leaders in a variety of disciplines, with an acknowledged bias towards military history. Episodes featuring intelligence historians Mark Stout, Betsy Rohaly Smoot, and Aaron Bateman are forthcoming.

Incorporate podcasts into your weekly routine and assignments for your students as well. Explore the world of intelligence through audio.

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**TRY THESE SHOWS**

- **The Modern Scholar Podcast**
- **International Spy Museum**
- **SpyCast**
- **Intelligence Matters**
- **I Spy**
I decided to start a “Substack” column to cover issues related to Canadian national security and intelligence, including possibly historical issues. The column is called “Wesley Wark’s National Security and Intelligence Newsletter.” The point of this short piece is not boosterism, but rather to talk about what a substack space might offer and why, and to encourage others to dip a toe into this social media opportunity.

First, a word about what Substack is, for those of you not familiar. Substack is an American online platform that “provides publishing, payment, analytics and design infrastructure to support subscription newsletters.” It was founded in 2017 and is headquartered in San Francisco. Substack has attracted columns by some famous writers (think Salman Rushdie and George Saunders). It has also attracted some criticism for hosting (and profiting from) newsletters that feature COVID-19 misinformation. Substack has limited to no censorship from the platform’s owners and operators.

From my limited experience to date it is a very easy platform to use and very sophisticated in its mechanics. A substack newsletter can either be free or involve a paid subscription. Mine is free (but maybe I will get greedy later).

Substack is easy to do, but that is not an answer to why one might create a newsletter or subscribe to one. I can really only speak to the creation piece. My motivation was to create an independent and additional space for public discourse on Canadian national security and intelligence matters. Such spaces are very limited. We might all agree that mainstream media coverage of national security and intelligence issues is sporadic, especially in Canada, and has its own issues in terms of depth and approach. There are no real academic publishing channels that would allow for timely publication, especially on topical issues. Academic publishing does not, of course, address a public audience or a broad readership. There are opportunities to address such an audience through blogs, podcasts, and personal web pages, of course. Substack is the new kid on the block. A substack column should be seen as an extension of such opportunities and possible a medium that will supplant them.

I was prompted to start my Substack column by the opportunities that the public hearings conducted by the “Public Order Emergency Commission” (POEC) is, and will, provide for all manner of revelations about the conduct of Canadian national security and intelligence. For readers not familiar the POEC is a judicial inquiry that is mandated in our Emergencies Act legislation (of 1988). It is hearing testimony throughout October and November 2022 related to the federal government’s decision to invoke the Emergencies Act in February 2022 (the successor to the War Measures Act) to deal with the events of the so-called “Freedom Convoy” (a.k.a trucker protest) occupation of Ottawa and institution of border blockades.

The first columns have reflected on some extraordinary testimony and records that have illuminated the work of the Ontario Provincial Police’s intelligence bureau in generating intelligence reports (The “Hendon” project) on the Freedom Convoy. Future columns will deal with whatever emerges in testimony from federal government officials and Ministers about their outlook on the Freedom Convoy.

That’s the horizon for now. There are many stories to be told about national security and intelligence in Canada. I hope to cover some of them. I would welcome suggestions for topics and even opportunities for guest writers to join me in this endeavour.
In many cases a book’s subtitle carries the magic words that convey its true purpose or focus, but with *A Question of Standing* your argument appears in the very first line. What makes “standing” such an important lens for understanding the CIA?

‘Deaf ears’ can be a CIA complaint about the president. It means an inability to listen intelligently—or an unwillingness to pay heed, in the belief that the CIA lacks the standing to merit a White House audience. The agency also needs to be in good standing with the House of Representatives with its power of the purse, and the Senate with its Constitutional powers over foreign policy. Equally, the CIA needs the support of the public as they vote for members of Congress and for presidential candidates, and as they are the reservoir for human recruitment—the agency always needs to hire good analysts, linguists, and others with specialist expertise. Finally, the *international* standing of the CIA has an impact on the exercise of soft power. In the book, I address some of the factors that have determined the standing of the agency.

I agree with the dictum that the American public reacts when its own ox is gored, for example on occasions when there are fears of excessive domestic surveillance. Foreign events such as CIA interventions aimed at regime change rarely play out in US domestic politics.

**You make the point that the CIA is more a direct descendent of U-1 than of the OSS. What was U-1 and what should intelligence historians understand about this organization?**

Frank L. Polk became Counselor to the Department of State in September 1915 and developed an intelligence capability with no name. When the job of Counselor changed its name to Undersecretary of State in July 1919, the unit he had established borrowed the first letter in the word ‘undersecretary’ and became known as U-1 (subdivisions were U-2, U-3, etc). The nation’s first central intelligence arrangement, it was very elitist (Ivy League) in character. It had the duty of coordinating and interpreting intelligence which it disseminated within a close-knit inner circle that included President Wilson. It also, but on a limited scale, ran agents. They included the English novelist W. Somerset Maugham who
submitted eye-witness reports on the Bolshevik takeover in St Petersburg and Emanuel Voska who schemed to set up the Czechoslovak state. The unit’s Edward Bell dealt with the British Admiralty in the matter of the Zimmermann Telegram. In 1927 amidst complaints about its ‘Harvard clique’, U-1 was dissolved, and its personnel departed for diplomatic postings. U-1 left an imprint in the minds of U.S. foreign policy makers regarding what American central intelligence should look like, but the U-1 experience also persuaded most diplomats that the Department of State should not be home to an intelligence agency that undertook potentially embarrassing ventures. While four future CIA directors served in the OSS, it is notable that the first of them, Allen Dulles, began his espionage career under the umbrella of the State Department unit while serving in Switzerland in World War I.

The year 1947 was a critical moment in the history of American national security and of the Cold War. The National Security Act of 1947 created—among other things—the CIA as a central clearing house for intelligence but also a potential home for covert operations. Talk to us about this unlikely combination and the importance of 1947 as a pivotal moment in American national security.

The 1947 act created America’s first permanent peacetime central intelligence agency. For the first time in world history (US history included), an intelligence agency had been created by democratic mandate. The manner of its creation contributed substantially to the CIA’s authority and standing, though it was also part of the implicit deal that the agency would remain accountable to the American people. Because of contemporary fears that a single all-encompassing intelligence agency would lead to a police state, the CIA was limited to foreign ventures, and it would run into trouble whenever it was tasked to operate domestically. It is important to note that while President Truman saw the CIA as a bulwark against Soviet threats, Congress in its debates leading to the creation of the CIA ignored the Soviets and emphasized instead the need to avoid another Pearl Harbor. The CIA’s resulting general-purpose mission gave the agency a rationale for continuation when the Soviet Union collapsed. The 1947 law did not specify covert operations, but its language allowed for them. At the Montevideo conference of 1933 and then by subscribing to the UN Charter in 1945, the United States had undertaken not to use naked force in the accomplishment of its ends. Covert operations seemed to be the alternative and did not arise specifically from the 1947 act.

To return to the question of standing for a moment—talk to us about the impact of CIA failures and the resulting fallout and loss of status that followed such episodes.

Iran 1953 and Guatemala 1954 were failures masquerading as success within US government circles. While the American public remained unaware that their government had conspired to overthrow democratically elected governments, world-wide there was condemnation of these events. The United States suffered significant decline in standing and lost its majority in the UN.
General Assembly by the end of the 1950s. The 1961 Bay of Pigs operation aimed at overthrowing Fidel Castro in Cuba was a failure in having been contemplated in the first place, but the inquisitorial spotlight in its aftermath illuminated only operational failure. A survey of world opinion in 1967 revealed that CIA covert actions, not the contemporary Vietnam War, were at the root of anti-Americanism. In the case of intelligence failures, one should immediately qualify by emphasizing the successes. The CIA punctured the bomber gap and missile gap myths in the 1950s helping to keep us all alive. There was crucial CIA input into the Iran nuclear estimate of 2007, a case of analysts speaking truth to power that averted what might have been a serious international conflagration. There were, of course, intelligence failures. Critics have long delighted in compiling lists of these. They did undermine the agency’s standing, but it should be remembered that the CIA, especially its director, is often the scapegoat for government failings - as JFK remarked, in the UK the prime minister would have had to resign over the Bay of Pigs, but under American arrangements Dulles had to go. In short, the CIA’s standing can decline because of administration shortcomings, not just because of its own failures.

Roll out the red carpet for your book—what would you like everyone to know about A Question of Standing and how it illuminates the history of the CIA?

I thought there was a need for an overview of CIA history that brings the story up to the present day, so the book’s coverage is slightly weighted on favor of very recent history. Nobody will ever write a ‘comprehensive’ history of the agency, as that would need to be world history given the global-power reach of the United States. In deciding how to be selective I plumbed for recognizable topics insofar as that was possible. This was because students often have time to read chapters but not whole books, and because members of the public at large might also want to pursue certain topics. Thus, there are chapters titled, for example, ‘Bay of Pigs’, ‘Vietnam’, ‘Iran and Iran-Contra’, ‘Fateful Terror and 9/11’, ‘Obama’s CIA and the Death of Bin Laden’, and ‘Fake News Comes Home.’

Mark your calendars for an upcoming Virtual Brown Bag presentation by Dr. Jeffreys-Jones on January 17, 2023.
The Uralov Report
A Literary Reconstruction of a Top Secret KGB File

It was a Friday, 28 January 1966.

Captain Korobov, senior operative of the Lithuanian KGB counterintelligence, was hurrying to a meeting with a long-time agent. In his pocket, Korobov carried a small black and white photograph of a man in a dark suit wearing glasses. He had just received the photo from his department chief and was told to take it to his agent immediately.

The KGB Headquarters at Lubyanka demanded quick answers. They were trying to piece together the history of the activities of a man named Kalas. Kalas was allegedly a Finn who was suspected of being a CIA agent. They knew nothing about his past except that he might have had connections in the Vatican going back to the late 1930s.

The Lithuanian KGB counterintelligence had an agent who was a student at the Vatican’s Collegium Russicum in those days and now lived in Vilnius keeping an eye on his friends and colleagues for the KGB. When he was recruited as a young man decades ago, he was codenamed URALOV in reference to the Ural mountains where his ancestors came from.

URALOV took a careful look at the photo Korobov hastily handed to him. He held it closely for some time before he spoke. “Yes,” he finally said. “This man reminds me of a person who was visiting my fellow student, the Estonian Ivan Raidla. I also remember Raidla saying that even though the man came from Finland, he was not a Finn, but perhaps an American or an Englishman.”
A sudden thought came to URALOV. Could this man have been a member of the Vatican mission sent to Finland in the late 1930s which was headed by two Russicum graduates, the De Calve brothers? The brothers provided financial support for the activities of the anti-Bolshevik Russians living there. Their mission was wound up in 1941 when the German armies pushed deep into the Soviet territory and the Soviet defeat seemed imminent.

“I even remember” – URALOV’s memories gushed forth, while Korobov tried to write everything down as fast as he could – “that once when I walked back to the Russicum with the Pope’s personal secretary Robert Leiber after his lecture at the Pontifical Gregorian University, he mentioned that the mission of the de Calve brothers provided him with the information about the Bolshevik atrocities against the Finns.”

Korobov stopped writing and gave his agent a look of disapproval. URALOV immediately changed the topic. “There was also another man, with a beard, about 50 to 60 years old. He could have supplied Leiber with that information. It appears that he was involved in some kind of negotiations with the cardinal Eugène Tisserant. But that’s all I remember; it was so long ago.”

Korobov was losing interest. He already only half-listened when URALOV spoke of a Finn who worked at the Vatican Library but perhaps was not a priest at all. That did not interest him in the least. He did not care to listen to URALOV’s haphazard recollections. He accomplished his task: he got a confirmation of the likely presence of Kalas in the Vatican in the 1940s. He could not wait to report his finding to his department chief who will relay it to the Lubyanka. Who knows, he might even get an honorable mention on the Day of the Chekist.

The original file can be downloaded at http://www. kgbveikla. lt/docs/show/6956/from:652 (in Russian).

by Dr. Filip Kovacevic
Listening in the Cold
The U.S. Air Force Security Service and the Cold War

It was cold.

Taking in the dilapidated, World War II-era barracks upon arrival in the middle of the night was a stark and unwelcome wake-up call—a far cry from the rural Mississippi farm where the young American airman had been raised. RAF Kirknewton, a small air base in southern Scotland, had been used by the British Royal Air Force as an anti-aircraft station during World War II, as well as a temporary holding area for German prisoners of war en route to the United States. Leased by the United States Air Force after the war, the base was now home to a radio squadron of the United States Air Force Security Service, the runways filled not with planes but with antennae, designed to collect encrypted Morse radio signals emanating from the nearby Soviet Union.

During the dead of winter and covered in snow, the landscape harbored an unforgiving, almost desolate character as the airmen took round-the-clock shifts in the communications compound with their radios and teletype machines—a vivid representation of the Cold War these young Americans had traveled so far to wage.

Created at a time when the U.S. military was experiencing wholesale reorganization, the Security Service was a small but powerful intelligence organization created to give the nascent Air Force competitive footing in the post-World War II intelligence community. The organization of the USAFSS as a major air command was an unprecedented departure from the normal military intelligence establishment—the COMINT structures of both the Army and Navy were under the control of larger commands, where the USAFSS was
not. Formally established on October 20, 1948, the Security Service was given the dual mission of providing for the communications security of the U.S. Air Force and collecting communications intelligence, largely encrypted Morse intercepts, in regards to the air forces of the Soviet Union. Soon, the organization had established itself as one of the preeminent communications intelligence agencies in the U.S. intelligence community.

It is easy to describe the Security Service as a group of mavericks, but this characterization is largely derived from the views of U.S. Army leaders and government officials in the years immediately following World War II. Air Force leaders and intelligence officers may not have seen themselves as disrupters, but were nonetheless intent upon creating a communications intelligence capability that would provide for Air Force needs in a new and rapidly developing Cold War environment. Studying the rise of the Security Service in the immediate postwar arena reveals a tension between the executive impetus towards the centralization of communications intelligence, often couched within concerns for efficiency and economy—and the mission-focused priorities of the individual services.

Both the U.S. Navy and the burgeoning Air Force resisted the gathering push for centralization, but their motivations differed. For the Navy, consolidated communications intelligence presented a systems issue—communications intelligence was inexorably integrated into the naval communications structure and naval leaders viewed this arrangement as crucial to the naval manner of command—a system which centralized control of military communications intelligence would disrupt.

For the Air Force, however, it was a matter of survival.

An independent communications intelligence capability meant overcoming dependence upon other services, notably the U.S. Army, for air intelligence information, representing a key step in the evolution of the Air Force as an independent service. Given the importance of communications intelligence to strategic bombing, itself part and parcel of the Air Force’s service identity, remaining dependent upon other agencies for intelligence, and or subordinating Air Force intelligence capabilities to joint control and direction, was an untenable proposal. The Army Air Forces consistently pressed for increased intelligence autonomy throughout World War II, and debates continued after Air Force independence and through the early evolution of the Security Service.

World War II Secret Interrogation Centers
by Dr. David Bath | Rogers State University

During World War II, the United States established two secret interrogation centers for prisoners of war brought to the country for interrogation, one in Fort Hunt in Washington, D.C. and the other in Byron Hot Springs in California. These centers were created to help interrogators gather critical information of long-term strategic value from key prisoners while field interrogation centers focused on short term, tactical information. Byron Hot Springs focused mainly on Japanese prisoners while Fort Hunt was used primarily for German and Italian prisoners.

Prisoners were selected for interrogation based on their knowledge of a particular region, technical knowledge, or because of their civilian or military experience. Interrogators reviewed all information that had been gathered about the prisoner for hours to provide the impression of omniscience to the prisoner. After the interrogator ensured the veracity of the prisoner’s statements by asking questions based on information previously given, interrogation procedures had them focus on the prisoner’s “general schooling, business, sympathies and antipathies in regard to politics, economics, and ... social life.”

Later, interrogators delved deeper into the prisoner’s military career and the recent actions of his unit. If the prisoner refused to answer, the interrogator did not press further, but attempted to make the prisoner uncomfortable by sitting or standing quietly before moving on. Later interrogations focused on what the prisoner had heard about the conflict in Europe, Africa, and the Pacific and about the importance of each battle. Interrogators pressed for information that the enemy wanted to conceal or minimize as well as the enemy plan of action or future strategy. Although the interrogator would take notes on
responses, other personnel recorded all discussions for later review.

Interrogations were not the only method used to gather information. Prisoners were intentionally assigned to rooms with prisoners from different areas or placed with a “stool pigeon” previously selected and their conversations were monitored. Transcriptions were prepared in the original language with doubtful words or missing phrases identified. If a stool pigeon was used, they were told what information was wanted and then allowed to use their own methods to obtain it.

If a prisoner from Byron Hot Springs was deemed “dependable,” he was sometimes taken for dinner and drinks in San Francisco where interrogators used a different style of interrogation. Others were taken to U.S. naval vessels or military installations to have them review the similarities and differences in U.S. and Japanese capabilities and equipment.

Although some of the methods used to gather information were not strictly following Geneva Convention guidelines, there was only one reported violation. This dealt with five German prisoners who were on trial for the murder of another prisoner who had been forced to stand at attention for long periods of time and caused other physical discomfitures such as unnecessary inoculations and the use of a gas mask in which an onion had been rubbed. Those responsible were asked to take a reprimand so that the situation did not become an international incident.

Although interrogations at the camps did not begin until late 1942 and early 1943, they appear to have been successful. The centers were maintained until the end of the war and information gathered was provided to the appropriate authorities to influence the conduct of the war.

Dr. David Bath is the author of Assured Destruction: Building the Ballistic Missile Culture of the U.S. Air Force, published by the U.S. Naval Institute Press.
Need to Know: World War II and the Rise of American Intelligence by Nicholas Reynolds

Many people might peg the beginning of U.S. intelligence either with George Washington in 1775 or with the National Security Act of 1947. While both dates are important, intelligence historians know that between George Washington and the National Security Act, U.S. intelligence mostly flowed to support the government and military in wartime and ebbed in peacetime, with a few flows directed at domestic unrest. The common view prior to World War II (WWII) seemed to be that the U.S. Government generally did not have an ongoing need to know what was going on under the surface of its foreign relationships and that regular policing could handle any domestic issues. After WWII, and embodied in the National Security Act, the common view was that foreign intelligence was necessary for the long-term. Since then, there has been a continuous effort to review the intelligence process and its products, to investigate “failures” and shortcomings, and to suggest many different reforms trying to “get it right,” but there has never been serious discussion of “shutting it down.”

WWII was clearly the turning point. Nicholas Reynolds does a great service by offering readers what they “need to know” about the crucial pivot in U.S. intelligence between 1940 and 1945. Policymakers came to accept that there was a long-term and wide-ranging “need to know” about potential problems and adversaries. Intelligence practitioners worked to figure out how to create products and processes that could best fulfill that need. The intelligence bureaucracy realized that cooperation internally and externally could make a big difference. Producers and consumers came to understand that while the large global apparatus built during the war would undoubtedly morph into a different form, the U.S. intelligence machine was here to stay.

While there are hundreds of good books about American and Allied intelligence in WWII, this one’s value is in its broad perspective. First, Reynolds makes some necessary references to WWI to show that WWII intelligence did not materialize in a vacuum but was a major departure from what had come before. To find the larger patterns across WWII intelligence disciplines and agencies, Reynolds examines signals intelligence, human intelligence and covert action as practiced by the U.S. Army, the U.S. Navy, the Office of Strategic Services, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He examines the key role of the British as mentors in shaping the form of American intelligence and training individual American officers. He details the U.S. and British signals and code-breaking cooperation which laid the foundation for the long-term British-U.S. signals agreement. He mentions aspects of broader Allied intelligence cooperation which made D-Day and other selected operations possible. Because the book has such a broad perspective, the flow might sometimes be hard to follow if the reader is not already somewhat familiar with WWII or U.S. intelligence history, but even for less informed readers, it is worth digesting the details to understand the bigger picture.
Throughout the book, Reynolds focuses more on the political and organizational side of things, as may be required to show the transformation of U.S. intelligence. However, he provides excellent balance by fleshing out the people, painting many small pictures of their personalities and interactions. He singles out some of the players for more in-depth attention: Joe Rochefort, William Freidman, Alfred T. McCormack, Henry L. Stimson and William Donovan, to name a few. For these people, he highlights their standout contributions to the rise of modern U.S. intelligence, describing how some of them persevered in their individual efforts despite the bureaucracy (sometimes at the cost of their health or career), while others used their vision, position, and abilities to reshape the bureaucracy for the better. Reynolds succeeds in often allowing the participants to speak for themselves through excellent sourcing to diaries, memories, personal interviews, declassified papers, government documents and other well-researched books.

As a former intelligence practitioner, I appreciate how Reynolds combines his historian and practitioner experience in telling the story. Steeped in excellent research, his understanding of both the business and the bureaucracy allows him to smoothly and accurately assemble the pieces. He describes selected operations to illustrate the strengths and weakness of how intelligence functioned during the war, covering some failures, some indifferent efforts, and some successes. He catalogues the strategic impact of signals intelligence in the naval war and describes how signals intelligence was married up with other efforts for the success of D-Day. He shows how quickly the OSS learned its way around the covert action and human aspects of intelligence (Operation Torch in North Africa and Detachment 101 in Burma, and Bern Station), but points out the OSS failure to deliver strategic intelligence at scale as compared to the signals effort.

WWII circumstances, followed closely by the beginning of the Cold War, forced both practitioners and policymakers to adjust their views on intelligence. This book is not just the story of the foundation from which the modern U.S. intelligence apparatus evolved; it is also an excellent case study in intelligence transformation: how organizations and individuals think about intelligence and what drives change. Reynolds lays out not just what we learned, but how we learned it, and how we implemented change to transform intelligence. The U.S. Government has spent the following almost 80 years continuing to transform our intelligence community in response to different circumstances and will hopefully continue that transformation as necessary. Reynolds has provided an excellent historical resource not only laying out the crucial changes that made the rise of the modern U.S. Intelligence Community possible, but also showing how complex making such changes will continue to be into the future.

Maura Godinez is a retired CIA operations officer and 30-year practitioner of intelligence, as well as a former Professor of the Practice in Intelligence and Cyber Operations Policy and Practice.
The Book Club Celebrated Its 30th Meeting in November 2022

Filip Kovacevic created and organized the NASIH Silent Game book club in June 2020. Since then, the club has met on the last Tuesday of each month, studying and discussing one book per month. During this past year, book club members have taken turns nominating spy novels, but our work does not end with a simple read of an exciting tale. Filip sends all the members a list of penetrating questions during the week before we meet. After that, the group (which includes former intelligence practitioners and scholars with expertise in foreign languages and years of research in international intelligence documents) carefully assess each work for realism, for meeting the definitions of spy novels, and for other relevant content, including each novel’s literary merits. Over the past two years, the meetings have been filled with healthy, respectful debate.

As the member with the least familiarity with the intelligence world, it is my great pleasure to list below short biographical clips from our many expert group members which provide some idea of why they participate and what their background is:

**Filip Kovacevic: founder**

Originally from Montenegro, Filip Kovacevic teaches at the University of San Francisco and specializes in Russian intelligence history, spy fiction, and the translation and analysis of documents from the KGB archives. He has lectured and taught across Europe, the Balkans, the former USSR, and the U.S., including two years in St. Petersburg, Russia. He is currently writing his third book, KGB Literati: Spy Fiction and State Security in the Soviet Union under contract with the University of Toronto Press. Filip was the first Montenegrin to earn a doctorate in political science at a US university.

**M. Kathryn Barbier:**

With exception of last year when she joined from the United States Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs, M. Kathryn Barbier participates from Mississippi State University in Starkville, Mississippi, where she has been teaching history since 2003. Although she teaches a variety of courses, a popular one among the undergraduates is her Intelligence Gathering in the Twentieth Century class. She enjoys the Silent Game discussions and found them particularly engaging and helpful when, during the pandemic, her teaching style changed. Because the format was synchronous online, she shifted the focus of the course from the history of intelligence gathering to understanding spies and spying through popular culture, i.e., novels and movies.
Gill Bennett:

Gill Bennett joins the meetings from London and has worked as a historian with the British government for well over 40 years. She specialises in the history of secret intelligence and has spent much of her career debunking conspiracy theories, as well as writing her own books. She really enjoys the Silent Game discussions, particularly since the group includes so many people with personal knowledge of the subject matter willing to tell a tale.

Dr. Martin D. Brown:

Dr Martin D. Brown is an associate professor of history at Richmond the American University in London. He has published extensively about Central European diplomatic history and is currently editing a volume of essays entitled: The Bondian Cold War: The transnational legacy of a cultural icon. He enjoys the Silent Game book club because it forces him to read things he’s never thought of, and the discussions around each book are wide-ranging and super informative.

Isabel Campbell:

Isabel Campbell is a senior naval and military historian at the Directorate of History and Heritage, National Defence Headquarters, Ottawa. She has a strong interest in intelligence history and gender analysis of operational intelligence. She has benefited from the readings and the group discussions.

Mindy Haas:

Mindy Haas is an assistant professor of international affairs in intelligence studies at the University of Pittsburgh GSPIA, but she has enjoyed Silent Game Book Club discussions since the dark days of writing her dissertation in 2021. She loves an excuse to read new and classic spy fiction, and she learns from historians and practitioners to inform her own international relations scholarship on intelligence, law, and international security.
Lisa Hawke:

Lisa Hawke learned about the Silent Game Book Club while attending the NASIH Conference in 2022 for novel research. She joins from New York City, where she spends the days working as a lawyer at a small tech company and the evenings writing. After spending years reading spy fiction by herself, she’s really enjoyed the opportunity to talk about spy books and intelligence history with the Silent Game members.

Jim Knights:

Jim Knights is a retired FBI Special Agent residing near Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. During his 26-year career he was involved in counterintelligence, among other types of investigations, and had temporary assignments to the legal attaché offices at the American embassies in Moscow and Cairo. He was deployed to Iraq in 2007. He has written four historical novels. A veteran of the US Coast Guard, he is now a historian with the US Coast Guard Auxiliary.

(NB we read one of Jim’s excellent novels, Soldier Girl Blue available at this link: https://www.amazon.ca/Soldier-Girl-Blue-James-Knights/product-reviews/163320068X)

Nora Ruebrook:

Revolving time frames and historically journeys down alleys and hotels chasing The Fox (book) to A Coffin for Dimitrios (book) each month the Silent Game group runs the gambit through a different book categorized as a spy novel and in several cases with the diverse background of the group we discover some behind the scenes ‘real facts’ on which the books appear to be based which makes each book review an additional adventure. The experiences of those joining in enriches the novel’s words and story. Nora Ruebrook joins us with years of experience in the Intelligence domain.

Mark Valley:

Mark Valley is an actor/writer who is fascinated with spy literature. He’s also a West Point graduate and served in Berlin during the Cold War. He currently hosts and produces the intelligence/espionage podcast: thelivedrop.com
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<td>Lara Prescott</td>
<td>The Secrets We Kept.</td>
<td>New York: Knopf</td>
<td>2019</td>
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<td>April 27, 2021</td>
<td>Michelle Butler Hallet</td>
<td>Constant Nobody.</td>
<td>Fredericton, Canada: Goose Lane</td>
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<td>Frederick Forsyth</td>
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<td>James Fenimore Cooper</td>
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<td>Nicholas Shakespeare</td>
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<td>W. Somerset Maugham</td>
<td>Ashenden: or The British Agent.</td>
<td>Heinemann,</td>
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<td>Michael Ondaatje</td>
<td>Warlight.</td>
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<td>Louise Penny and Hillary Rodham Clinton</td>
<td>State of Terror.</td>
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New Books


New Books


The NASIH website is getting an upgrade!

For more information about the society and its activities, upcoming programs and events, membership, and to learn about the members of our Executive Board, visit us online at www.intelligencehistory.org.

Declassified Documents!

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has declassified and released a number of Historical series and documents:

- Director of Central Intelligence Series
- Deputy Directorate for Operations Series
- Directorate of Intelligence Historical Series
- Support Services Historical Series
- Directorate of Science and Technology (S&T) Historical Series
- OCD Series (Office of Collection and Dissemination)
- Office of Emergency Management, National Defense Research Committee of the Office of Scientific Research & Development
- And more!

Happy 75th Anniversary National Security Act!

In celebration of the 75th Anniversary of the National Security Act of 1947, the International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence has provided free, limited access to recent articles.

A link to these are available on the NASIH website at: www.intelligencehistory.org/declassified***
Call for Newsletter Items!

We are already planning a Spring 2023 issue of this newsletter, and we need content from all of YOU! If you, your colleagues, or your programs have important updates that you would like to share, please communicate with our Editor-in-Chief, Philip Shackelford by email at pshackelford@southark.edu.

The NASIH newsletter publishes updates from our special groups, information about upcoming intelligence-related conferences, new books, collections of declassified documents, and more. We also include articles and book reviews in every issue. If you have an item to share please get in touch with us first with your proposed topic and format, and our staff will be in touch.

The deadline for newsletter submissions is April 1, 2023.

For back issues of our newsletter and other information about the North American Society for Intelligence History, visit our website at www.intelligencehistory.org

Share your news items with us!